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

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STUDY PROJECT

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE: AN APPLICABLE STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s?

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE: AN APPLICABLE STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s?

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ABSTRACT

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Security Assistance has been an essential element of American foreign policy and military strategy for two generations. As described in the recent Department of Defense Statement to Congress, security assistance involves the United States in pursuing its national interests and aiding other nations in preserving their own national security. However, born in a Cold War environment, security assistance is in jeopardy. Recent changes in world political structures suggest that this program may have little relevancy and questionable viability in US security objectives for the 1990s.

This paper is an assessment of the future utility of security assistance as a major US foreign policy and security instrument, focusing on its arms transfer element. In this presentation an historical as well as contemporary perspective will be provided for evaluating the program's relevancy to continue US security objectives. Furthermore, an examination of the "political-military" structure will be undertaken, keeping in mind the program's coherency to its domestic and international political environments. Finally, an appraisal of the program's viability for the 1990s will be given, highlighting, the sources of international instability, addressing the dichotomy of arms sales and arms control; the regional and international impact on security assistance; and, an assessment of its utility in the recent Gulf Crisis.

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INTRODUCTION

An important security issue confronting America and its allies during the 1990s will be weapons proliferation. The Gulf Crisis (and subsequent war) revealed the extent to which arms transfers can be destabilizing, certainly in a region like the Middle East. Yet for the US (and some allies), there is a paradox. On the one hand, they have arms-transfer interests and policies that can be argued contribute to the proliferation problem; such a charge has been made regarding the US security assistance program and the arms transfers it involves. This program, which in 1992, is projected to cost $8.0 billion (down from $8.5 billion in 1991), includes foreign military financing, economic support funding, international military education and training and peacekeeping operations.1 On the other hand, the provision of security assistance to friendly foreign countries and allies can help both to deter aggression and to improve those countries' defensive capabilities against external threats, and thus, in this context, may be linked to the furtherance of regional stabilization and international peace.

What makes this program so vital to US national security is the realization that the US certainly will not be able, in the future, to muster a Gulf War armada, the likes of Desert Storm. The changes in World Order brought on by the end of the Cold War,

immediately followed by the Gulf War, pose more questions than answers for this American foreign policy tool. The significant argument for the continuation of security assistance programs is found in this widening "capabilities gap" effected by the US reduction of military forces fitting the end of the Cold War; compounded by an international resurgence of civil turmoil caused by anxieties for national sovereignty. And the one aspect which dictates a reduction in US forces, will be countered by another requiring that the US provide more security to its friends and allies to maintain their own defensive capabilities. Security assistance has the potential to span this gap by furnishing a method for sustaining close international ties and providing the wherewithal for security and ensuring stability for those emerging national entities.

Security assistance has been an essential element of America's foreign policy and military strategy for two generations. As described in a recent Department of Defense (DOD) statement to Congress, security assistance programs have involved the United States in various ways with the militaries of friendly and allied nations. In addition to regulating arms transfers, the current program provides assistance in the following categories: Foreign Military Financing, which today has mainly been reduced to a grant aid program to assist in acquiring defense articles and services (including training); Economic Support Funding, which provides an all-grant program to promote economic reform and development; International Military Education and Training, which furnishes

professional military education and technical skills under grant aid; and Peacekeeping Operations, which finance US contributions to the United Nations Force in Cyprus and to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai.2

Because it has its origins and initial rationale in a Cold War environment, the relevance of security assistance program is now questionable. Recent dramatic changes in international security suggest to some that it will have little or no utility in the New World Order.3 Moreover, security assistance, should be thought of as an efficient alternative to the actual use of American military force, as well as, a promoter of national and international policy aims which include the preservation of US national independence and the protection of its Allies vital interests by guaranteeing democratic, economic, and political determination of those regions vital to the US. However, security assistance is now being perceived, because of its arms-transfer element, as a source of international instability. Nor does it help matters that the program is often seen to be primarily driven by political and economic factors instead of security objectives.

In what follows, I will focus on the arms-transfer element of security assistance, and in so doing, will provide an historical as well as a contemporary policy perspective. As such, I will be chiefly interested in the utility of security assistance for the furtherance of major US foreign policy and security interests. I will be mindful of what might be called the "political-military

structure" within which the program operates, for it is clear that the domestic and international political environments are such as to require a seemingly endless process of adjustments and accommodations in policy, at the "tactical" if not the strategic level. My overall objective is to answer this simple question: Does security assistance have a future? In moving toward this answer, I assume the post-Cold War period will not be a threat-free era; indeed, I highlight the likely rise in new sources of international instability. I conclude that the security assistance program should be retained, but is subject to several important domestic and international considerations which I will highlight.

Security Assistance: A Relic of the Cold War?

It is sometimes argued that American security assistance is a vestige of the Cold War era and should be abandoned. Those who make such a claim; however, tend to commit a categorical error, in failing to see that what they take to be a context-bound program is really a more broadly based phenomenon, since beyond the US security objectives to preserve national independence, there is an extended purpose to safeguard the interests of US Allies. These national objectives are pursued with the security assistance program by, enhancing the ability of US allies to deter aggression; maintaining alliances; developing good military to military relations; promoting regional stability; providing access to bases and facilities; strengthening key economically depressed countries; and, providing support to emerging democracies.4 The application

of security assistance in the history which follows will emphasize the difficulty to which a program based on such lofty ideals can universally meet expectations and deliver satisfaction in the rapidly changing world environment. As will be seen, the program, which was essentially postured to satisfy both the American ideology for democratization and stabilization through deterrence in Western Europe, has suffered a fundamental change in purpose due to a diminishing threat and a basic flaw in application because of a perception of its universal capabilities.

The Antecedents of Security Assistance

Military assistance and arms transfers have a lengthy history of being integral to foreign relations and national security. It might even be argued that the roots of security assistance can be traced back to Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War. The subject of arms transfers and military assistance is as controversial today as it was when Aristophanes objected to the armament industry's threat to the peace of Greece.5

American history provides many instances of military assistance, from both the recipient's and donor's perspective. For instance, during the Revolutionary War, French arms suppliers were perhaps indispensable in maintaining the colonists' momentum in the early stages, during 1776 and 1777. During the Civil War, arms were a prominent aspect of the unindustrialized South's imports, something not lost upon the North, when it launched its blockade of Southern ports. From 1914 to 1917, a period of American

neutrality, the US became a major supplier of armaments to the Allies; to such an extent that the issue later arose as to whether arms merchants had not jeopardized America's very capability to distance itself from the European war. In 1934, the Nye Commission, a senatorial committee set up to investigate this question, recommended tighter regulation in both the manufacturing and the transferring of arms.6

In the early phase of the Second World War, US military assistance for British efforts was organized through the destroyers-for-bases exchange, done with Britain in September 1940 and the Lend-Lease arrangements of the following years (also extended to other allies). In channelling aid to Britain in 1940, the administration had to circumvent federal neutrality legislation that prevented or impeded such activities. In the case of the destroyers-for-bases exchange, this was achieved by the administration's certifying that the ships were less essential to national security than were the basing rights, a stratagem that would set the tone for subsequent executive-legislative interaction, and one that would continue to characterize the politics of security assistance.7

Since the end of World War II, US security assistance programs have undergone an enormous set of changes, although it has continually been sold in the venue of anti-Soviet rhetoric. The first architects of containment envisioned checking the spread of Soviet expansionism in Western Europe by reliance almost exclusively on economic and financial aid. Indeed, it was a major

concern of Washington that an emphasis on rearmament would delay the recovery of Europe; thus in the early postwar years, military assistance was regarded as potentially confuting the first priority for Western Europe, economic revival.8 As we know, events of Soviet expansion into areas of influence, soon led to a sweeping reassessment of the merits of security assistance to its European and other "friends and allies" the world over. To understand this reassessment and to comprehend the current status of the program, it is necessary to have some insight into the exigencies of the domestic political process in the United States. As well, it is important to review the major international developments that have led to the enhanced prominence of security assistance over the past decades. I suggest that such an examination will show that security assistance, far from being a relic of the Cold War, can be of continuing relevance to US foreign policy and military strategy.

The Evolution of Security Assistance: The Early Years

President Truman quickly discovered after 1945 that winning a war did not mean a world at peace. Confronted with the fact of increasing Soviet domination of Eastern European countries, Truman reacted to the real prospect of Soviet political and even territorial gains in Turkey and in Greece by enunciating what would soon develop into a full-blown policy of "containment", one seeking to counter Soviet expansion anywhere, with whatever means were required.9 This policy depended upon both economic and (eventual-

ly) military assistance, the latter often in the form of collective defense or alliances. In putting this policy before Congress, Truman indicated that he hoped non-military assistance would be sufficient:

> I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure....I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly process.10

The continued spread of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, however, convinced the Truman administration that economic assistance alone could not contain Moscow. In 1948, the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries signed a collective defense treaty, known as the Brussels Pact, in many ways, the precursor of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which would in 1949 become the military corollary of the Marshall Plan with its economic focus.11 What dollars were for the latter, military assistance would be for the former. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the instrument that provided military aid to NATO and other countries, thus marked the beginning of a new era in security assistance. However, the program designed to counter the bold attack on democratic values and international stability in Western Europe was quickly overlaid worldwide where, although instability was prominent, the basics of democracy were not. The "globalization" of security assistance program to counter Soviet was here witnessed in the US involvement in the Korean War, as well as, through Washington's energies directed at the formation of a series of collective-defense agreements during the

1950s.12

In 1952, Dwight Eisenhower, Republican presidential candidate, proposed boldly to transcend containment.13 In his inaugural address the following January, Eisenhower stated that there was "no free nation too humble to be forgotten".14 However, this did not mean that there was no price too large to be paid for defending others. Eisenhower did not believe in massive defense spending, and instead proposed a "New Look", in which there would be a great reliance on the nuclear strategy of "massive retaliation", accompanied by limited use of military ground forces only to those areas of vital US interests, namely Europe and Japan.15 Elsewhere, it was expected, as John Foster Dulles explained to the Senate, that protection against aggressors could be met with bombs not ground forces.16 Thus was established a principle that continued to characterize American security assistance; the idea that US technology would, ideally, substitute for the country's military forces.

A more ample understanding of the expression, "Allies", would characterize many of the treaties initiated in the Asia/Pacific region by Eisenhower and Dulles. In like fashion, the very idea of security assistance also tended to take on broader dimensions, and soon terms such as internal security, counter-insurgency, civic action, and nation building became staples of containment lexicon.17 Nor were concepts the only things to expand; funding levels for security assistance grew apace. From a one-sixth share of the foreign aid budget in the years 1949 to 1953, military grant aid

funds would swell to more than half of the foreign aid appropriations during the Eisenhower budgets of 1953 to 1961.18 This latter expansion did not go unnoticed by Congress.

The administration of John F. Kennedy inherited not just Eisenhower's restrictive options of nuclear "massive retaliation"; it also, was bequeathed the growing congressional yearning for greater oversight of foreign aid programs. In his first State of the Union address, President Kennedy sought to defuse this yearning by impressing upon the nation that freedom was under attack everywhere: "Each day the crises multiply....Each day we draw nearer the hour of maximum danger....The tide of events has been running out and time has not been our friend."19 Kennedy thereupon proceeded with what was hitherto the largest arms build up in modern US peacetime history (in absolute terms), increasing the defense budgets by nearly fifty percent in his first two years in office. His objective was to gain some flexible option to "massive retaliation", primarily by expanding the NATO conventional force deterrent.20

In other areas, Kennedy sought to "support any friend, oppose any foes" by offering whatever security assistance he deemed necessary. To counter the prospect of Castro's revolution being expanded to other Latin American countries, he directed considerable amounts of economic and military aid southward. However, after a promising beginning, the economic program known as the "Alliance for Progress" was allowed to languish. Other regions captivated both the Kennedy and Johnson defense planners' thoughts

as well. The Middle East resurfaced as a key area of interest because of its critical oil resources. There, the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which had been largely grant funded, took on a very different aspect as supported countries became more affluent and Foreign Military Sales (FMS), a cash-and-carry type program, became the major method to transfer armaments.21 And in Indochina, where the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had earlier supported the French in maintaining a foothold against communism, Presidents Kennedy and later Johnson and Nixon would see fit to engage in a protracted conflict using millions of American ground forces and enormous amounts of military assistance.

The Struggle with Congress Over Security Assistance

For Richard Nixon, in particular, Vietnam was a disastrous situation; one he did not create, but did have to resolve. At the very onset of his administration, the US troop level there was nearly 550,000.22 The annual amount of military and economic aid being transferred to Southeast Asia was in the billions of dollars; the American public and Congress were becoming extremely disillusioned with the war effort; and the public mood called increasingly for more Congressional oversight and legislation of the security assistance programs. It was in this context that the Foreign Military Sales Act was enacted, requiring the administration to ensure US foreign policy interests were stressed in all arms sale transactions; this in response to concerns over allegations of a new "merchants of death" thesis. Nixon's own

security assistance policy can be glimpsed in his "Guam Doctrine", in which he stated that the United States "would look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense".23

Foreign military sales increased rapidly under Nixon, who was less than pleased about the more assertive arms sales review process in Congress. After Watergate, legislators were hardly of a mood to allow the White House a free hand, and responded by further limiting executive powers, amending the 1975 foreign authorization bill, so as to require Congressional notification for arms sales of more than $25 million.24 President Gerald Ford would find that efforts to reopen security assistance to Latin America would elicit Congressional resistance to both the lack of program controls and the administration's inability to verify effective human rights programs within recipient countries. Moreover, Congress and public opinion, in an era of superpower detente, had difficulty accepting the logic of a foreign aid program that was perceived only to counter Soviet threat. The upshot of these trends was a series of Congressional restrictions being attached to security assistance, culminating in 1976 with the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act, which emphasized "control" in lieu of arms sales; severely cut the military assistance infrastructure; and, withheld assistance from countries suspected of human rights violations.25

The Carter Administration took a different tack on security assistance from its predecessors. A new emphasis on human rights

would be a hallmark of this president's foreign policy, as was evidenced in his inaugural address, when Jimmy Carter set the stage for foreign policy matters, by stating that the US would "never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere; our commitment to human rights must be absolute".26 Consistent with this new stress on human rights, the administration was determined that, henceforth, foreign military sales be used as the exception to support other governments to meet their defense needs by themselves. To be sure, this policy did remind some of the Nixon Doctrine, but it also coincided quite well with Carter's own resolve to reduce arms sales.27 In doing so, however, it created some nettlesome contradictions, especially those stemming from the desire to restrict arms flow on the one hand, and on the other, continue to use them to support US friends, allies, and established agreements.

In an effort to satisfy the desire to reduce arms transfers, Carter conducted a review of arms sales policies that eventuated in Presidential Directive 13, unilaterally restraining the US from arms sales, except where necessary for national security. His ability to get other governments, in particular the Soviets, to accept this policy met with less-than-complete success on specific regional issues, and resulted in the subsequent failure of the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks.28 In the cause of promoting human rights, the administration did make large cuts in military and security assistance programs, fearing these would be used for inhumane purposes.29 Yet at the same time, Carter was attaining his greatest foreign-policy victory by weaving an Egyptian and

Israeli peace accord with the costly and controversial thread of security assistance. Ultimately, the contradictions were never resolved, and by the time he left office, Jimmy Carter was seen by public opinion and Congress to have contributed to an overall reduction in the US security posture.30

The Balance Begins to Shift

The new administration of Ronald Reagan made the strengthening of US military capability its chief priority as a greater perception of the Soviet threat after Afghanistan in 1979 caused a return to an explicit containment policy. Defense spending was drastically increased and the foreign aid/human rights policy of the Carter Administration was concomitantly de-emphasized. In addition, Reagan believed that security assistance was neither good nor evil and the arms transfer capability was an essential support for US foreign and defense policies. In security assistance, Reagan reversed Carter's preference for eschewing arms transfers, establishing instead guidelines for promoting them, specifically by evaluating each proposed arms sale on a case by case basis. The Reagan policy was formally announced in a 21 May 1981 speech by James Buckley, Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance; "Arms transfers, judiciously applied", said Buckley, "can complement and supplement our own defense efforts and serve as a vital and constructive instrument of American foreign policy".31 The new security assistance policy featured revived arms sales to Latin America and China, as well as, continuation of support for the

enormous security guarantee established by Carter's Camp David Accord.32

An even larger deviation from the practice of the Carter Administration was a willingness to use force to counter threats to American interests. Although the peacekeeping forces in Lebanon met with disaster, an invasion of Grenada rooted out a rag-tag band of Marxist extremists, backed by Cuba; an air attack on Libya led that state to reassess the utility of fostering terrorism; aid for the Contras in Nicaragua contributed to the Sandinista government's decision to gamble on democratic reforms and free elections; and, support for Afghan rebels had a part in the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Ironically perhaps, the most amazing fallout of Reagan's aggressive foreign policy was a renewed openness in US and Soviet relations, accompanied by a startling retreat of communism in Eastern Europe; the latter effected in part by a new Soviet respect for US defense initiatives, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

George Bush has maintained the same commitment to aggressive foreign policies as did his predecessor, certainly insofar as security assistance programs are concerned. Reginald Bartholomew, Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, recently stated that the Bush administration would continue the Reagan administration's policy of using arms sales as a tool of foreign policy, and would actively support US defense exports if they advanced US interests. Bartholomew did add that the administration is also determined to consult with Congress on

politically sensitive arms transfers.33 As the Bush 1991 foreign aid submission indicated, Congress began to show renewed interest in this policy tool.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, it will not be an easy task for the White House to shape a consensus on the need for a continued security assistance program. Nevertheless, the need does remain; security assistance need not and should not become a casualty of the ending of either the Cold War or the Gulf War.

As I have sought to demonstrate in this brief historical survey, successive administrations have made active use of security assistance as an extension of US foreign policy. Although, not universally consistent in theme or application security assistance was utilized with the aim of furthering national objectives. And, while American ideology stresses democratic values, the true benefit of security assistance is viewed in a judicious flexing of military input to stabilize areas vital to national interests, in many cases, with little regard for "ideology". Sometimes security assistance was used to support ailing governments; sometimes to secure cooperative agreements; sometimes to barter for peace accords; sometimes even to advance human-rights' objectives. Whatever the specific objectives associated with previous reliance on security assistance programs, they were applied within the context of the long-standing and legitimate US foreign policy objective of fostering a stable, peaceful world conducive to national security, economic prosperity, and individual freedoms. Moreover, often embedded within a Cold War framework, security

assistance is not exclusively linked to Cold War policy.

I will argue in the remainder of this paper, that challenges of the New World Order will continue to summon a need for the security assistance program, but without some major adjustments in its process and structure the foreign and domestic policy objectives of the program will not be accomplished.

Unilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Durability of "Threat"

If security assistance is to be a coherent instrument of US policy, it must maintain consistence with important national interests. These interests, as stated, include the preservation of a "free and independent nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact", and are extended to friends and allies in "safeguarding their interests by discouraging aggression".34 These concerns will obviously prompt some need in the coming decade for policy responses situated in the middle of a continuum ranging from doing nothing, at one pole, to directly using military force and declaring war, at the other. What interests might be served by a constructive use of security assistance during this period? Put alternatively, how might US foreign policies be advanced in a new world order?

It would appear at the outset that the critical threat in this world order is instability itself, caused in some measure by new demands for ethnic, religious, national sovereignty or perceptions of uneven economic progress. One writer has noted, aptly, that the diminution of East/West rivalry has not ushered forth into an era

of no, or minimal, threat. By the end of the 1980s, wrote Irving Kristol, "One heard less--and hears less today--about a community of nations living tranquilly under international law, and more of our commitment to the 'enhancement of democracy' around the world. As the Cold War has come to an end, this remains the dominant official motif of American foreign policy."35

The Gulf War, the world's and America's first major crisis in the aftermath of the Cold War, has lent urgency to Kristol's point. The fact is, that the Gulf War did not establish democratic values in either Kuwait or Iraq, or for that matter Saudi Arabia, but, was testimony of US resolve to provide stability for regional self determination. No longer can the US shape its security policy by reference to a well-known (and well-worn) coda derived from Cold War verities. It may be that the decades-long threat from the Soviets has disappeared; it is premature, however, to imagine that "threat" per se has been banished from international policies. Beyond addressing instability as the threat, there must be a strategy to counter that threat. Security assistance provides the means to offset such a menace, but only in a focused manner. Not all instability, i.e., international tensions, can or should be anticipated and resolved with arms transfers. In fact, the opposite of stability might very well be the result of such a policy. For example, while a case can be made in Western Europe and Korea for the capabilities of security assistance; other methods of diplomacy may have provided some positive corollary in Vietnam and Iran.

As witnessed, America's diplomatic history has been marked by an abiding lack of patience for the frustrations of foreign policy. The US tendency is to have issues "resolved" quickly, following which the American public seeks shelter from the rigors implicit in living in the international anarchy. This is apparent in the lack of willingness of Americans to become the world's policemen.36 Isolationist yearnings can be described in the US in the immediate post-Cold War period, something John Muravchik has observed, "The last time America found itself in such an impregnable situation", he wrote in August 1990, "was in the immediate aftermath of WWI. The Kaiser had been defeated. New democracies were being erected on ruins of old empires. ...[O]ur isolationists succeeded in defeating [Woodrow] Wilson's visionary schemes. Thanks in part to their prudence, within 20 years we were fighting for our lives."37

The Gulf War has assuredly got the attention of the American sleeping giant, and the question of the moment is whether the powerful hulk will slip back into repose or whether it will assume a more active defense and security posture, commensurate with its new-found respectability as a capable military actor, and its stature as the world's remaining superpower. If it is to be the later, there arises the further question of whether it pursues its foreign-policy goals through unilateral interventionism, versus some greater reliance on "internationalist" solutions, involving either the United Nations or creative multinational coalition-building (or, as in the Gulf case, both). And if the answer to the

further question is that internationalism, not unilateral interventionism, will characterize the country's foreign and security policies in the 1990s, then it would follow that security assistance must remain an important tool for American policy makers. However, there is no guarantee that security assistance will assume greater importance in the 1990s; for even if Washington clearly follows an "internationalist" course, dependent on multilateral diplomacy, it is still possible to envision security assistance being so encumbered by constraints as to lose much of its political effectiveness. These constraints, which can be internal or external, I discuss in the following section.

The Domestic Politics of Security Assistance

A major problem facing the security assistance program is the political process itself by which goal and objectives get identified, defended, and, if successfully transformed into "policy", implemented. Of course, security assistance programs are far from being the only programs--whether military or civilian--to be subjected to the pulling and hauling of what Roger Hilsman labels "the political process model".38 That being said, it is arguable at least, that by its very nature, security assistance is subject to more than the "normal" range of domestic political pressures. In this section, I highlight the phenomenon of what I term the "political-military" dimension of security assistance. The political constraints on security assistance programs are embedded in this political-military process, and the

historical record clearly shows that overlapping administrative prerogatives and perceptions can and do fundamentally change how such programs get developed, and with what success they get implemented.

The Gulf War provides a case in point. Although much attention is now focused on the wisdom of providing arms to Saudi Arabia and other coalition allies, in the aftermath of that conflict, it could be argued that expeditious security assistance prior to the onset of Iraq's expansionary musings could have deterred Iraqi aggression in the first place. Prior to 2 August 1990, the US political-diplomatic process appeared insensitive to regional security by failing not only to supply requested security assistance to Iraq's neighbours, but also by not forcefully sanctioning Iraq from further international arms transfers and for having used chemical warfare during its war with Iran. US resolve might have proven effective in either instance, but instead of policy clarity, there was confusion with consequences that would only become obvious by late 1990.

Paul Gigot has observed the inability of the US foreign policy bureaucracy to react to several different world situations simultaneously, which engenders the very instability it is supposed to defer; in the case of Iraq, the US "failed to give even the most basic signal that might have instilled caution in Saddam".39 In the winter of 1989 with all eyes focused on the East European Revolution and the related achievement of German unification, the Iraqi dictator was amassing a chemical and biological arsenal and

striving assiduously to develop a nuclear weapons capability, with the immediate purpose of controlling the Gulf region and the valuable resources located there. These actions were in nearly all ways overt, but the glare of the events in Europe caused the American foreign policy makers not to see the significance of developments in the Gulf. With hindsight, we now know the choice of focus to have been wrong.

The argument here is that a coherent and steady program of security assistance can result in a future that, if not totally surprise-free, is more resistant to unforeseen events than was the case in 1989. Structured and implemented properly, security assistance can further American foreign policy objectives, including regional stability in the Gulf. The question becomes, then, can one structure security assistance in such a way to permit it to function in a changing world? To start, certain major structural impediments can be identified and remedied. Chief among these are: a) the chaos of the political-military process in the domestic context; and b) the lack of a viable international regime for regulating international arms transfers. The two impediments are related, albeit not identical. It is or should be apparent that enhancing international stability through the judicious employment of arms transfers requires, at the outset, internal changes in the US security assistance process, so as to allow needed rationality in funding levels and--more importantly--funding purposes. It also requires something else: international rationalization, by which I mean the creation and employment of a

viable international control body for arms transfers.

Getting security assistance "right" means starting at home with the domestic political-military process. Perhaps the most evident reality of security assistance is that it functions within an American democratic political process of checks and balances that at times seems almost guaranteed to frustrate the program's very purpose. For example, programs that were "only" 50 percent directed by Congressional Committees as recently as the mid 1980s, although showing some improvement from 1990 to 1991, are today restricted by mandated Congressional controls involving 87 percent of the foreign military sales, and 68 percent of the economic support fund budgets.40 The program designed for purposes of stability and security is driven by the Congressional leaders in the Foreign Affairs and Relations Committees and the Military capabilities of the program are inextricably fastened to the political machine. Not surprisingly, program flexibility and capabilities have eroded as administrations and Congress alike have continued, in recent years, to partition major portions of program funding to preselected recipients, who in turn are beneficiaries of rigorous lobbying efforts on their behalf. Particularly noteworthy in this regard have been the political action committees for such countries as Israel and Greece.

The chief defect of the political-military process is the siting of security assistance in a foreign relations, instead of defense, framework. What this means is that security assistance gets assessed, debated, and ultimately funded, and administered by

a combination of the State Department and the foreign affairs "and, increasingly, the appropriation" committees of both houses of Congress, rather than the Department of Defense and the armed services committees of the House and the Senate.41 But, although the military dimensions cannot be separated from the political objectives of this program, a more evenly weighted process would reinforce the security assistance objectives. To understand why the current structure is inefficient, let us take a look at the major players in security assistance.

The Issues and Players in Security Assistance

Paul Warnke, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for international security affairs, correctly noted that an intrinsic problem for US arms sales policy has been that it, "lacks coherence and overall limits. Several government agencies with quite different perspectives and interests are involved in the policy-making process and it is therefore, difficult to attribute the policy outcomes to any single agency".42 A necessary element of any reformed security assistance must obviously be establishing that the actors in the process understand what the program is supposed to accomplish. In a new world order, security assistance should attempt to enhance US national security by strengthening allies and friends, deterring conflict, while at the same time advancing US political interests. Additionally, it can also be assumed that a variety of interests will continue to expect to derive domestic economic benefits from the program. This

expectation, alas, can and does conflict with the prior aim of furthering regional stability, and is in fact a major hindrance in the success of security assistance, one moreover that is attributable in large part to the program's lack of any broad domestic constituency.43 Program "reformers" must be aware of this, just as they must understand the agendas promoted by a myriad of powerful political action committees, with wholly different program objectives from that of regional security.

Reformers must also understand the content of the program. Security-assistance advocates need first to answer a simple question: Who is being secured from what? Absent any clear answer to this question, there will be little chance of breathing much new life into the program. What must be remembered is that US national objectives of security assistance to promote democracy and open markets, although ideological, require the stabilization of regional areas vital to US interests. As seen, the focus of security assistance has changed from the selected Western European democratic cradle to a global ethnic, religious, and political cauldron and the pursuit of those lofty US national objectives has and will continue to require some "strategic alliances" and the wherewithal to secure such agreements.

Security assistance provides a capability for such realization, but it should be remembered that this capacity is effected through the supply of defense commodities and services, such as weapons, technology, and military training. Keith Krause instructs us on the inherent politico-strategic nature of those

commodities: "Weapons that kill are not purely economic goods to be bought and sold as copper, computers, or coffee".44 But because of the lucrative nature of much of the arms business, there will always exist a commercially driven tendency to ease arms-transfer regulations and controls in order to secure greater economic benefits.45 In fact, arms-transfer controls were relaxed during the Reagan Administration, and while some economic benefit undoubtedly resulted from the relaxation, it came at a cost to international stability.

The objective of minimizing the influence of mercantile interests in arms transfers, however laudable, is a difficult one to attain. So too is the goal of establishing an all-encompassing international forum, or "regime", to regulate arms transfers. For one thing, the US defense industry would be hard put to accept restrictions if it was felt that other nations were continuing relentlessly to promote their own arms sales. Furthermore, given the current comparative advantage enjoyed by US arms makers in the area of high-tech weaponry, it can be expected that consumers, especially in the Third World, will expect and possibly demand more sophisticated weaponry, and even technology, from the United States.

Another factor impelling the US arms industry to acquire more foreign markets is the looming reduction in America's annual defense spending. Over the next five years, the level of the US armed forces is projected to be cut by a quarter. This translates into a 33-percent reduction of the current active Army divisions;

28-per-cent of the Air Force wings; and 14-percent of the Navy carrier battle groups.46 For an armaments industry which views divisions as tanks, wings as airplanes, and carrier battle groups as ships, these reductions obviously constitute a very serious problem. Some in the industry are coping with this dilemma by an enhanced focus on off-shore sales such as the proposed Saudi Arabian agreement to purchase 315 M1A2 tanks, which will permit tank assembly lines in Warren, Michigan and Lima, Ohio, to remain open.47

The security assistance reason for a viable defense industrial base in the US, outside of the strong political domestic economic rationale, is the capacity to utilize arms transfers to secure regional stability through alliances built on US technology and the grant and cash sales aspects of the program. Again, the political-military structure must be scrutinized to ensure that the purely political salient response of economic benefits does not overshadow the military reality for the security and stability requirements.

The program's impediments are not exhausted by a simple depiction of the contradictions noted above. One must also examine the bureaucratic players in security assistance. The major protagonist in the US arms transfer process, of course, is the President, and his Executive Branch. The departments of State and Defense, the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and such other departments as Commerce and Treasury, coordinate with Congress on arms transfer activities. Not surprisingly,

conflicts occur as each institution works from a somewhat different perspective to effect what it believes is the security assistance objective.

Within this bureaucratic process, the Department of State is the agency charged, under the Foreign Assistance Act, with administration of the security assistance programs. Within this mandate, it oversees the military departments that execute the program, and so doing it coordinates activity both with the National Security Council system and the Defense Budget process.48 Sometimes, "coordination" can be an overstatement. For example, during the Reagan Administration, a strong National Security network with loose management from above instigated the "Iran-Contra" debacle, in which arms transfers were used to circumvent legislative restrictions on support for the Nicaraguan Contras.

In more typical cases, there are certain channels through which relevant bureaucratic barges make their way. For instance, the link in the Department of Defense budget process is through the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), which plans, administers, and accounts for the Defense involvement in the program. The international requirements for the program are generated through security assistance organizations located in the US Mission of the individual country. These offices, in turn, coordinate with ambassadors and regional US commanders to focus on regional needs.49 But, what may seem, even in the "typical" case, to be a straightforward method of assessing security assistance requirements is actually a very constrained and protracted

procedure, dictated by budgetary and Congressional processes in which there is little apparent flexibility.

The Office of Management and Budget is concerned, naturally, with the budgetary implications of the security assistance program; to say the least, it poses a serious problem for program flexibility. The cyclical budget process, weighted heavily in the direction of prior submissions, and subject to pre-emptive assessments as to what Congress is likely to fund, can be a daunting ordeal, one in which security assistance requirements often fall by the wayside even before getting considered in the legislative process. This budget process, in effect, strangles the program by severely restricting the establishment of new security assistance cases. Moreover, once a budget mark has been established, changes in the requested levels of security assistance can only be effected by the intervention of the Secretary of State with the President.50

The capacity of this structure to limit program change is even more evident by the State Department's development of case-by-case country components of security assistance. Franklin D. Kramer, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, notes in discussing the Department of State and the Department of Defense inter-agency review process that "generally, the Security Assistance Planning Review Working Group will decide to increase or maintain program levels, not to decrease them".51 When this proclivity is added to Office of Management and Budget's "anticipatory" dynamics, there results little program flexibility, with few new security assistance requirements able to be presented

to Congress for justification.

Interestingly, the most concerned executive actor in this process, the Defense Department, which is assigned the mission of implementing the military means for security assistance, watches perplexedly as support gets couched in political, not military, terminology. This "art" of transforming military means into political objectives stands as a stark reminder of the extent to which the international political components of the program are privileged vis-a-vis the military-security ones.52 This privileging does, in fact, drive a wedge between the support users (the military) and the support providers and congressional interests. Significantly, up to this point in the process, the military's only input is its contribution of information concerning country-by-country security requirements within a regional context, all with the view to furthering political objectives.

A further wrinkle stems from those actions taken by the departments of the Treasury and Commerce, which sometimes appear to be preoccupied with issues altogether divorced from national security. As an example, the recent Gulf War highlighted a number of high-tech products that, according to news reports, had been approved and licensed by the Commerce Department and sold to Iraq over the objections of the Defense Department.53

An additional indication of the complexities of the security assistance process can be glimpsed in Congress' own recent task force review of the US foreign assistance programs and activities. The reviewers found that foreign aid, including security assist-

ance, "was vital to promoting US foreign policy and domestic interests, but that the program was hamstrung by too many conflicting objectives, legislative conditions, earmarks, and bureaucratic red tape".54 Robert Kurz of The Brookings Institution, a former congressional staffer, similarly stresses the complications attending security assistance programs, especially those laws that, based on outdated information, require re-evaluation to ensure legislative conformity to each new set of events.-55 Ideally, national security requirements should be the initial impetus for this change in foreign policy legislation, since the political-military process must have the capacity to act with some flexibility to accomplish security objectives.

Congressional involvement occurs at several points in the security assistance process. But throughout, Congress retains notification requirements and veto authority over security assistance for major combat equipment and other defense equipment or services.56 And, though presidential requests for arms sales have notoriously met with Congressional approval, this accomplishment is often possible only because of political compromise; witness the arrangement of the Executive branch in submitting the security assistance requests and having it withheld from the Congressional Record for 20 days, allowing the congressional review process additional time to react.57 More importantly, such action permits the Executive an additional period to bargain with Congress and modify security assistance requests to meet the final Congressional expectations. A good example was the threatened Congres-

sional veto of the 1986 Saudi Arabian arms package, which caused President Reagan to delete 200 Stinger launchers and 600 reloads from the original request, in order to win the veto override.58 The effect of such political gambits on assistance programs can understandably erode the security gains sought through the program.

What is lost in the bureaucratic pulling and hauling is any appreciation of the value of the proposed security measures. The convoluted process of give and take distorts the real necessity for regional security. A better US security assistance process needs to address regional security requirements, and not merely perpetuate a system that supports the same select friends and allies, year in, year out. Furthermore, the process must garner a constituency that is less interested in arms transfers for their domestic economic value and that comprehends arms transfers are necessary for US national security.

Regional Security Approach

A missing element in this process of US governmental politics, although one which is continually espoused in the preparation of critical foreign policy objectives, is a refined security awareness of regional complexities. Missing as well is any receptivity of the process to regional US military input, given the weight of political and budget-driven forces. In effect, if security assistance dies, it may not be the Cold War's demise, but rather the bureaucratic process that is responsible. Regional input to security requirements is the groundwork on which the

program should be based. The regional commander whose responsibility it is to span national borders in the effort to enhance regional stability should have a primary voice in this process. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Commanders-in-Chief now have this capability. By this measure, Congress demonstrated its intent to improve the quality of military advice, and to enhance the responsibility and authority of the Joint Commanders, who are now expected to have a greater voice in regional security policy.59

The voice has apparently been present, but the effect of its presence remains uncertain. For instance, in early 1990 testimony of the Joint Commanders to the Congress, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the Central Command warned, that the Mid-East region, which his command encompasses, was experiencing a growing availability of long-range missiles as well as of biological and chemical weapons. This phenomenon, said Schwarzkopf injected a "new and alarming lethal dimension [in]to the region... The US is providing too little security assistance to even meet the basic needs of several strategically important nations".60 I introduce this example to make the point--and it is hardly a surprising one--that regional commanders like Schwarzkopf have a good grasp of certain regional "sensitivities", and deserve to have their expertise make a contribution to the rationalization of security assistance policy.

The Joint Commanders' role within the security-assistance process should be strengthened. But how should this be done? In

addition to providing expertise at appropriate moments, the CINCs should be given some control over the process itself. One means of doing this might be to channel annual security-assistance budget and defence-acquisition funding through the CINCs. Specifically, the DSAA should be the DOD agency responsible for apportioning and reviewing this capability in accordance with State Department approval and Congressional oversight. As things currently stand, the legislative restrictions and earmarks on funding make security assistance ineffectual from the CINCs' position as the regional security implementors. At times, the current arrangement can actually hinder, not advance, US security interests.

The International Context

The second major conditioning variable affecting security-assistance programs is international. Specifically, there is a worrisome trend toward fewer controls over arms transfers. Certainly, many of America's recent problems in the Gulf have been occasioned by such activity. Joseph Nye, a former Deputy Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, has identified the generic root of this problem:

> Some trends in world politics suggest that it will be more difficult in the future for any great power to control the political environment and to achieve what it wants to from others. The problem for the United States will be less the rising challenge of other powers than a general diffusion of power.61

This "diffusion of power" can be expected to have an impact upon the US security assistance program in three ways. First, it may well weaken the program's effectiveness by reducing the leverage

Washington can bring to bear on its friends and allies. Second, it could add more instability to the international arena by the proliferation of arms. And finally, it will render the process of controlling international arms transfers even more unwieldy, than it now is.

Washington's capacity to shape this environment will further be affected by America's own economic problems. Budgetary deficits and other domestic issues likely will capture the attention of US policy-makers during the coming years, making it more difficult for the US to exercise a role as world leader and to assume a position as key advocate for an international arms-control forum. But we can be certain that the threat to international stability caused by the arms trade will only grow throughout the 1990s. Arms transfers were a prominent feature of the Cold War world, and so are nothing new. Recent arms transfers, however, have slipped the "constraints" imposed by the Cold War, and there now exists an enormity of markets and an abundance of potential suppliers, not only throughout the Third World, but possibly also in Eastern Europe.62

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that international arms transfers are, on balance, a major contributor to international instability. Iraq's outsized consumption of imported arms in recent years should dispel the notion that the end of bipolarity suggests a more equable security future for the Third World. Iraq's ability to amass both conventional and non-conventional weaponry should alert Western governments to the need for more

restrictions on their arms peddlers. It is easy to point fingers. One could start by citing the Pentagon inquiry into possible bomb-technology transfer to Iraq from Honeywell, Inc.63 In fact, the dilemma is enormous, and can be seen in the French missiles, the German gas, the Austrian artillery, and the Swiss machinery, to say nothing of the Soviet and Chinese weaponry, that added to Iraqi military capability. Not only are there many potential weapon suppliers, there is also no shortage of "middlemen" in the arms-transfer process--and not just in the Gulf region.

Clearly, regulatory structures in this area have not been conspicuous by their presence.64 This is no excuse for not trying to do better, and the US is obviously not without guilt itself, since in the cause of "regional stability" it was one of the parties funnelling assistance to an Iraqi dictator pursuing his own regional aims.

These pre-Gulf War failings emphasize the need for the US to provide strong support to international regulatory agencies that could monitor arms transfers. Such agencies ideally would be built upon the foundation of multilateralism generated by the Gulf War. This is not to say that coalition diplomacy functioned perfectly during that conflict. Nevertheless, the model is an encouraging one, and the US should avail itself of relevant international fora from which to address the critical arms-transfer control issue.

Recent (often reluctant) "confessions" by the major arms suppliers concerning their overt and covert arming of Iraq represent, at least, a start toward some multinational acknowl-

edgement of the seriousness of the problem. As Mark Lowenthal, senior foreign affairs specialist at the Congressional Research Service, notes, "Arms trade is something which must be factored into a new world order... The Iraqi case has given us an example of what happens if this (trade) is left unchecked".65 What is needed, however, is more than contrition. The US and other countries must commit to "simultaneous endeavours" to bring about arms-transfer controls. To be sure, the US must continue to support friends and allies with the necessary security assistance to defend and maintain their security. However, the effectiveness of this objective will continue to be diminished to the extent that both international and domestic US policy rationalization is missing. Internationally, the United Nations should be the forum for such dialogue on arms transfers. Domestically, the security assistance process must give greater responsibility to the regional military experts, the CINCs.

The time has never been better for such bold initiatives, and the celebrated "window of opportunity" has rarely been so ajar, with the world's attention still focused on the effects of the Gulf War. There is no universal agreement among nations concerning stability and arms-transfer controls and there will never be. However, these subjects must remain as central topics for the world council, and it is incumbent upon the US to take the lead at the United Nations to call for the establishment of an effective arms-transfer control mechanism. The US now has the opportunity to forge such a mechanism, which would not only strengthen the

capability for international stability through control of arms transfers, but in doing so may also benefit US international influence and increase the utility of US security assistance.

The Case of the Gulf: A Question of Influence

The Gulf War, as alluded to, is a case for some immoderate examples of the complexities of US utilization of security assistance. The program in this region, most assuredly, can be viewed as structured to stabilize the Middle East, in the aftermath of several conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The 1979 Camp David Accord formalized an agreement that had long provided favoured nation status to Israel. With that agreement a similar bond was made between Egypt and the US and billions of dollars of security assistance were subsequently furnished to both of those countries for the purpose of securing regional stability. In 1990, the amount of security assistance provided to Israel and Egypt alone was $5.1 Billion, or fully 61 percent of an $8.4 Billion program for that year.66 In the wake of the Gulf War, the US Congress and US public might rightfully question, what influence did this enormous amount of military aid provide?

The question of US political influence with Israel is certainly not a new subject. In fact, the invasion of Israel on October 6, 1973 by Egypt and Syria, was prompted, in part, by the failure of US diplomacy to force Israeli concessions with its Arab neighbours, and, at the same time, antagonized by the US supplying Israel advanced fighter aircraft.67 A good example of both a

failure to utilize the favoured nation relations and to successfully avert conflict with the leverage of the security support arrangement. The Gulf War was another matter and enforces the current perception of Israeli reliance on US support and the capacity for US influence in that region even with the overwhelming Israeli political pressures in the US congress. Certainly, in viewing the restraint of Israel to forego involvement in the Gulf War, as Scud missiles rained down on Tel Aviv, indicates the marked benefit this influence tempered with a close security assistance arrangement can produce.

This influence which security assistance can bring to bear, as this paper has attempted to document, is however, not universal by its application, but in fact, can and does have quite a variety of responses. For example, during the Gulf War's preparation the US could not have anticipated the reaction of Soviet aided Syria to participate so supportively in, or the US backed Jordanians to reject so vehemently, the US lead coalition force. This issue of arms transfer influence will continue to be questioned by the program's sceptics. Its answer lies in not only understanding the program benefits for US national objectives, but often, the not calculated national interests of those supported friends, allies, and now, many other would be American imitators.

The time to adjust an international arms sale transfer policy in the Middle East is now. Granted, adequate defence capabilities are needed in the Gulf Region, however, in the immediate aftermath of the War, the threat from Iraq has been substantially diminished.

What must now not be permitted is the creation of new threats of international instability, as nations posture to pour billions of dollars of arms back into that region. Actions, currently being taken may cause irreparable damage as the US fails to restrain its arms sales tendencies or fails to use its influence to effect reforms from friends and allies. The time is right to test the American influence, and not when that region is again over-armed.

US national security objectives must more broadly encompass the ability to understand and be sensitive to the national interests of other nations. However, the post-Gulf War US philosophy appears at odds with such international diplomacy as both the Congress and the Administration posture to open arms market capabilities to the Middle East, for while Congress has called for restraints to arms sales in the Middle East, it has also proposed a package of reforms to streamline the sales process by, increasing the threshold requirements imposed on the Executive for reporting to Congress; authorizing transfer of Defense equipment to Allied stockpiles; and, granting below market rate loans to arms purchasers. The Bush Administration also is not in agreement as to the lessons of the Gulf War or the direction to take in its aftermath concerning arms transfers. The inconsequential arms transfer control policy rhetoric proposed in President Bush's commencement addresses and his refusal to acknowledge a Canadian proposed arms restraint policy, while visiting Ottawa in early March 1991, are contrasted by a White House attempt to revive credits for arms exports using the Export-Import Bank.68

Conclusion

The central question regarding US security assistance in the 1990s will certainly not be whether there exists a continued need for such a program: there does. The real question is whether, within the changing world environment, it can retain effectiveness and quickly respond to the challenges to vital US and Allied interests which will characterize the post-Cold war world. In the long run, the program's survival depends on its mustering a broader constituency that understands and supports its objectives. Whatever the future holds for US security policy, one thing seems certain: America will likely be called upon again to use military means in pursuit of policy objectives. The next time, however, coalition warfare may not be as feasible politically. Unless one can imagine a world in which unilateralism can secure US policy goals, it is perhaps not a bad thing to adhere to the homely wisdom of Dale Carnegie. But, to "win friends and influence people", America will have an ongoing need for a security assistance program. Will the necessary domestic and international reforms be achieved to permit such a program to function?

Notes

1.Department of State and the Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1992" (Washington: Department of Defense, 1991), p. 1.

2.Ibid., p. 3.
Security assistance is defined by the US Department of Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 1, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms", (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 June 1987), p. 327, as that group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defence articles, military training, and other defence related services, by grant, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

3.Richard A. Clark, "The Changing Nature of US Military Assistance", DISAM Journal 13/1 (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), 1990), pp. 8-9.

4.H. Allen Holmes, Testimony to Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 8 March 1989.

5.Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance (Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1990), pp. 1-9.

6.Geoffrey Kemp, "The Arms Trade Phenomenon", in Arms Transfers and American Foreign Policy, ed. Andrew J. Pierre (New York: New York University Press, 1979), pp. 16-19.

7.Paul Y. Hammond et al., The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decision Making for Arms Sales (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983), p. 3.

8.John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 73.

9.Ibid., p. 22.

10.President Harry S. Truman, 12 March 1947 speech to Congress (Washington: Truman Presidential Papers, 1947), p. 179.

11.Of course, Secretary of State Marshall qualified the plan to Congress by suggesting that it was necessary to save Europe from communism.

12.Richard F. Grimmett, "The Role of Security Assistance in Historical Perspective", ed. Ernest Graves and Steven A. Hildreth, U.S. Security Assistance: The Political Process (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973), pp. 1-14.
However, for each instance where security assistance has been effective, such as Korea for the past forty years, there are the examples such as Vietnam and Iran where no amounts of security assistance have secured national objectives.

13.Stephan E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 133.

14.Eisenhower Inaugural Address, January 20, 1953 (Washington: Public Papers of the President: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953), p. 6.

15.Donald M. Snow, National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S. Defense Policy (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 52-54.

16.Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, p. 145.

17.Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, Management of Security Assistance, p. 1-17.

18.Nicholas Eberstadt, Foreign Aid and American Purpose (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1988), p. 31.

19.Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, pp. 182-183.

20.Ibid., p. 186.

21.Graves and Hildreth, U.S. Security Assistance, p. 22.

22.Richard Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure for Peace" (Washington: Report to Congress by President Nixon, 1972), p. 110.

23.Roger P. Labrie et al., U.S. Arms Sales Policy Background and Issues (Washington: American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982), pp. 8-9.

24.Ibid., pp. 9-10.

25.Labrie, U.S. Arms Sales Policy, p. 10. The new title, "Arms Export Control Act", continues to be used.

26.Quoted in Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, p. 294.

27.Graves and Hildreth, U.S. Security Assistance, p. 75.

28.Hammond, Reluctant Supplier, pp. 169-177.

29.Eberstadt, Foreign Aid and American Purpose, p. 47.

30.Graves, U. S. Security Assistance, pp. 78-79 and Snow, National Security, pp. 67-94.

31.Quoted in David Siverberg, "Official: Boost Arms Sales", Defense News, 6 November 1989, p. 4.

32.Hammond, Reluctant Supplier, pp. 78-79.

33.Silverberg, "Official: Boost Arms Sales", 6 November 1989, p. 4.

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51.Ibid., p. 106.

52.Ibid., p. 107.

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